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Russia's Bid To Norway Speeds North Atlantic Pact

WASHINGTON—Moscow's attempt to dissuade Norway from joining the United States in the proposed North Atlantic alliance has strengthened, at least momentarily, the disposition of the Senate to approve the proposed defense pact, which is still in process of negotiation, even though the Administration has not yet made its details public. Whether the present enthusiasm of the Senate will last until it receives the treaty from the President cannot be predicted. Meanwhile, however, the diplomatic exchange between Norway and the U.S.S.R. has done Americans the twofold service of underlining the major political importance of the proposed pact in world affairs, and of forcing into the open the issue whether the White House and the State Department were acting on sound assumptions in promoting the North Atlantic alliance.

High officials in Washington have persuaded themselves that the pending pact will augment the power of the West in contrast with the power of the Soviet sphere, to the point that Moscow will respond by modifying its foreign policy, and even perhaps make a move for reconciliation with the West. They hold this opinion despite the fact that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its statement of January 29 on the proposed alliance, associated it with a policy of "unleashing a new war." Between now and the day the Administration submits the pact to the Senate the principal question that Americans can usefully debate among themselves is whether this treaty, by combining the Western powers into a single great military unit, would promote peace

or intensify the present dangerous tension between East and West.

Military Road to Peace

The Administration apparently finds in the events of 1948 grounds for its belief that, under modern circumstances, military strength makes for peace. After the Czech Communists seized control of the Prague government early last year, Congress, at the request of President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall, put the United States in a "military posture" by passing a draft act, increasing the size of the air force, and adding \$1.5 billion to the budget of the Department of Defense. James V. Forrestal, Defense Secretary, said on February 1 that the world situation has markedly improved since last spring, when Congress adopted these measures. While a number of factors besides American rearmament contributed to this improvement, the net effect of the change from spring 1948 to winter 1949 has been to give the Truman administration confidence that war is remote, whereas a year ago every official pronouncement carried the warning of approaching crisis. The President reflected the new attitude in his Budget Message on January 10, in which he insisted that the air force be limited to 48 groups of combat planes.

The Administration has caused confusion in public opinion, for it supports the North Atlantic pact, yet at the same time discards the arguments it used less than a year ago when it urged rearmament. The American negotiators of the pact, however, apparently hope that it will promote other objectives in addition to the rearmament of our European friends.

The pact is potentially another instrument for encouraging unity of action by governments of Western and Southern Europe. It is thus consistent with the political objectives of the European Recovery Program and carries forward the aim of American policy expressed in State Department support of the Fulbright resolution of 1947, which advocated the creation of a United States of Europe. This intense concern for consolidated action in Europe probably explains why the State Department announced on January 14 that Scandinavian nations would not receive military equipment free of cost from the United States unless they joined the pact. The Administration has concluded that full collaboration among the leading English-speaking North American powers and important Western European nations will fundamentally influence the Soviet world. As a result the Administration opposes separatist regional arrangements among its potential allies in Northwest Europe.

Norway—Focus of Conflict

The European powers do not universally share the Administration's desire for unity as conceived on this side of the Atlantic. But the common European desire to obtain military supplies from the United States makes the pact attractive. Washington's strict association of pact membership and military supply partly explains the present situation of Norway, which has become the focus of the diplomatic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Norway has a common border with Russia on the Arctic Sea, but in the currently divided world Norway puts itself on the Western side.

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Eight months ago Norway was impressing on Washington its interest in obtaining American military equipment. Yet early in January, after negotiations for the North Atlantic pact had opened in Washington, the Norwegian government tentatively considered joining Denmark and Sweden in a separate Scandinavian pact provided that it could obtain American arms through such an arrangement. The Scandinavian pact negotiations collapsed on January 30. On January 29 the Soviet Union in a diplomatic note asked Norway to explain its attitude toward the pact. Norway replied to Moscow on February 1 that "it is necessary to seek

increased security through regional co-operation in the field of defense," that "the necessary unanimity on the possibilities and consequences" of a Scandinavian alliance "does not exist," and that "the Norwegian government will undertake further investigations to find out in what forms and on what conditions Norway will be able to take part in a regional security system embracing the countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean."

The vague statement that "the Norwegian government will never join in any agreement with other states that contains obligations for Norway to open bases for the military forces of foreign powers as

long as Norway is not attacked or subject to threats of attack" did not alter the character of the reply, interpreted as a rebuff to Soviet hopes of dissuading Norway from joining the North Atlantic pact. On February 6 Foreign Minister Halvard Lange arrived in Washington to find out what obligations Norway would assume and what aid it would receive under the pact, and on the same day the Soviet Union proposed a nonaggression treaty to the Oslo government. Thus, in advance of its conclusion, the North Atlantic alliance has become an important factor in American-Russian relations.

BLAIR BOLLES

What Is Basis For Settlement With U.S.S.R. In Europe?

President Truman's Inauguration Day proposal for the use of American technical knowledge in the development of nonindustrialized countries not only constitutes, as pointed out earlier,* the most significant challenge the United States has offered to the U.S.S.R. since the war. It also has a direct bearing on the Soviet "peace offensive" begun with conciliatory statements by such Communist leaders in Europe as Marcel Cachin of France and Palmiro Togliatti of Italy, and climaxed by Stalin's answers of January 30 to questions submitted by Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service.

Soviet Bloc Underdeveloped

It is frequently forgotten that the U.S.S.R. itself as well as most of Eastern Europe, with the notable exception of Czechoslovakia, belongs in the category of underdeveloped areas. During the interwar years the Soviet government, despite profound ideological differences with the Western world, did not hesitate to use the services of Western technicians—from Germany and Britain, but most of all from the United States—for work on major developmental projects, notably the Dnieprostroy dam, constructed by the American engineering firm of Hugh L. Cooper. The record of the period 1919 to 1939 shows no more reluctance on the part of Soviet leaders to learn all they could from Western technology than has been true of the leaders of other nonindustrialized areas. What it does show is determination not to permit the introduction, along with Western technology, of free enterprise as it has been practiced in the Western world.

At the end of World War II the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe particularly devastated by the Germans, among them, Poland and Yugoslavia, were in urgent need of technical assistance, machinery and raw materials for reconstruction and further development. There seemed to be two possible ways of filling these needs promptly: large credits for purchases in the United States, the only great industrial nation unscathed by war; or large reparations from Germany, the principal prewar industrial nation on the European continent. It will be recalled that in 1945 the U.S.S.R. was reported to have made a request for a \$6 billion loan from the United States—a request which was then said to have been mislaid for six months on the desk of a Washington official. By that time relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. had so deteriorated that a loan in any amount seemed outside the bounds of practical politics. Washington's subsequent offer in 1947 to include Russia in the Marshall plan, leaving political considerations aside, would presumably have fallen far short of the \$6 billion figure, since the total amount allotted to the sixteen Marshall plan countries has turned out to be \$5 billion a year. The alternative possibility, urged by the Soviet government at the Moscow conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in April 1947, was the assignment to the U.S.S.R. of capital goods reparations (the Soviet figure set for this was \$10 billion) from the Ruhr—a demand that was rejected by the Western powers; and at the present time, as a result of East-West conflicts about the future of Germany, the U.S.S.R. has no voice in the administration of the Ruhr.

East-West Paradoxes

It is always dangerous in international affairs to assert dogmatically what is cause and what is effect—whether timely and effective economic aid by the United States would have prevented Russian intransigence, or whether Russian intransigence prevented such aid from the West. Would the Soviet government have applied increasing pressure to neighboring countries, especially Czechoslovakia, to obtain from them urgently needed products, had other sources of machinery and raw materials been available—available, it is true, on terms that the Kremlin would have regarded as acceptable? Despite Moscow's opposition to the ERP, and efforts by Communists in various beneficiary countries to disrupt it, Russia's neighbors, far from channeling their entire export trade to the U.S.S.R., as had been predicted in the West, have shown increasing eagerness to resume commerce with the West. The reason for this seeming paradox is that all the countries east of Germany, including the Soviet Union, need goods from the West, and that Russia, itself in process of reconstruction, cannot fill most of the requirements of its neighbors.

Growing recognition of this situation has caused some Western observers, who at first were inclined to consider the Council of Mutual Economic Aid announced in Moscow on January 25 as just another weapon aimed at the ERP, to revise their view and ask whether this Council, instead, might not be designed to consolidate and enlarge economic relations between East and West. Another paradox of current trade conditions in Europe is that the United States, which

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presumably should welcome restoration of East-West commerce as direct assistance to fulfillment of the ERP, has on the contrary been seeking to close up all chinks in the "Iron Curtain" not only to its own exports, but now also to exports from Western Germany, for fear they might increase the war potential of Russia and its satellites.

What Price Peace?

In answering the Kremlin's hints at the possibility of a settlement in Europe, the United States took a sound position on two points: negotiations between nations, or even approaches to negotiations, cannot be conducted through newspaper questions and answers; and this country cannot undertake bilateral talks without impinging on the interests of third parties, and without jeopardizing its obligations under the Charter of the UN. The latter argument, however, would have carried greater force if Washington had not, in fact, pursued the major aspects of its post-war policy outside the UN and the four-power Council of Foreign Ministers—

from the Marshall plan and the Truman Doctrine to the proposed North Atlantic defense pact which, although it may adhere to the letter of Article 51 of the UN Charter, may in practice threaten its spirit. Certainly all friends of international organization will have reason to be encouraged if, henceforth, as pledged by President Truman in his Inaugural Day address and by Secretary of State Acheson in his press conference on Stalin's peace bid, the United States really does lay its course squarely and unswervingly within the framework of the international agencies "charged with the responsibility for these questions."

But, assuming that a general peace conference were to be held under the auspices of the UN, what, it is being asked, would be the terms acceptable to the United States and to the U.S.S.R., as well as to other nations? Does the conflict concern strategic, political and economic questions susceptible of being fixed in treaties? Or does it concern questions about "democracy versus communism" as expressed by Pres-

ident Truman? Would one of Washington's cardinal objectives be abandonment by the Soviet government, and by Communists elsewhere, of their plans and practices—even if it should turn out that Communists may differ from country to country, as demonstrated by the Russo-Yugoslav rift? Would one of Moscow's cardinal objectives be abandonment by the Western powers of current efforts to affect the political and economic development of countries along the periphery of the U.S.S.R.? Lacking such information, it is difficult at this particular moment in contemporary history to decide which fork of the road may ultimately be followed—the development, with American technical assistance, of underdeveloped countries, whatever may be their ideologies, or acceptance of the inevitability of war and the rapid forging of rival regional alliances, at the expense of recovery and future economic improvement.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The last of three articles on President Truman's Inaugural Day address.)

Will Western Powers Change Policy Toward Spain?

A statement quietly introduced by the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Mayhew, in the course of a debate in the House of Commons on February 2 indicated that Britain and the United States now agree on the advisability of restoring full diplomatic relations with Franco Spain but may not be prepared to extend further concessions. Mr. Mayhew said that his government was no longer committed to oppose any move to annul the controversial UN resolution of 1946, barring Spain from its midst and directing members to withdraw their heads of missions from Madrid.

Membership in UN?

Mr. Mayhew's remark coincided with the position of the United States as defined last October by former Secretary of State George C. Marshall at the Paris meeting of the General Assembly. Mr. Marshall explained that, while the United States was no longer in favor of diplomatic sanctions against Franco, it would not take the initiative in proposing their withdrawal. On the day after the House of Commons debate, the State Department announced that Washington's position remained unchanged.

A Latin American motion to the effect that the now embarrassing 1946 resolu-

tion be rescinded in its entirety would therefore probably pass the General Assembly when it convenes at Lake Success in April. It may be anticipated that a simultaneous attempt will be made there to propose Spain for UN membership which, if it should reach the Security Council on the General Assembly's recommendation, would be checkmated by a Russian veto. There is as yet no definite indication that the United States or Britain will support such a measure. The United States has held that so long as Franco stays in power Spain must expect to remain isolated from the organized community of nations. Washington's interest in the air space over Spain, however, may incline it to support a proposal that the Spanish government be invited to join the International Civil Aviation Organization and other specialized agencies of the UN.

In the eventful period since the passage of the 1946 resolution, the United States has swung around to what has been described in some quarters as an attitude of greater common sense on the Spanish question. One consideration which has prompted a re-examination of policy has been Franco's ability to ride out the consequences of collective intervention in even its mildest form. The Gen-

eralissimo is now said to feel so secure that in the past year he has been able to withdraw some of his soldiers and police from the streets, to curb extremist elements in the Falange, and to tolerate more open discussion of a successor government. Whether Franco's defiance of "foreign meddling" in Spanish affairs has won him the popularity with Spaniards to which foreign observers in Madrid attest is, of course, impossible to verify in a country where free expression of opinion is still forbidden. Such relaxation as has taken place may also be attributed to the hypothesis that the security police have at length succeeded in breaking up centers of organized resistance and terrorizing unorganized opponents of the regime to the point where their silence may be regarded as acceptance. But the most plausible explanation may be that, as the "Iron Curtain" advanced in Europe last winter, the Franco government found it both possible and expedient partially to withdraw the Spanish curtain.

Important as the fact of Franco's hold on the country has been in forcing a reassessment of policy in Washington and London, strategic considerations have been even more influential. It is recognized that the co-operation of the government which controls the land below

the Pyrenees and the approaches to Gibraltar may, under certain circumstances, be an essential requirement in Western security conceptions.

Strategic Arguments

How essential Spain may become depends on answers to a set of highly involved technical, economic and political questions about which no categorical judgment has yet been reached either in the United States or Britain. The procession of "unofficial ambassadors" who visited Madrid last fall indicated a strong current of opinion in favor of reappraising recent Spanish history in the light of the East-West conflict. One of the most outspoken exponents of this view in Britain is Winston Churchill who, in his foreign policy address before the House of Commons on December 10, stated that "it is a great mistake to allow legitimate objections to Franco and his form of government to be a barrier at this time between a country with whom we have many natural ties." Pointing out that "time has passed since Potsdam," when the Allies agreed to ostracize the Franco regime, the former British Prime Minister called for elevation of the present "black market diplomacy" to a free and open level.

The crosscurrent of opinion pulling against the "realistic" view of Spain, however, has gained strength commensurately with the growing confidence of the West in its ability to defend itself. This view opposes any greater rapprochement with the Franco regime than is necessary for the convenient conduct of diplomatic relations, and so would draw the line after exchange of ambassadors between Madrid, London and Washington. The persons who hold this view do so on the ground that at present, and so long as Franco remains in power, Spain is, as Mr. Mayhew stated bluntly, an "extremely doubtful asset."

OLIVE HOLMES

(Strategic and economic factors in the development of policy toward Spain will be discussed in a subsequent article.)

News in the Making

Improvement of the *technical skills of labor* in underdeveloped countries, an important aspect of President Truman's "fourth point," will be the subject of a conference of experts from the UN and specialized agencies which will meet in Geneva on February 17 under the auspices of the International Labor Organization. . . . Measures for the development of underdeveloped areas, with special reference to a proposal for establishment of a *UN economic commission for the Middle East* on the lines of similar commissions already in existence for Europe, Asia and Latin America, will be discussed at the eighth session of the UN Economic and Social Council which opened at Lake Success on February 7. . . . A newspaper man's unsuccessful attempt on the life of *Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi*, Iran's 29-year-old ruler, on February 4, which led to the suppression of the Tudeh (Workers') party accused of communism, and the shutting down of 60 newspapers, is one of a number of incidents indicating the existence of explosive tendencies in the Middle East. . . .

André Siegfried, distinguished French writer on political problems whose teaching and writings are familiar in the United States, declared in an article published in the conservative newspaper *Figaro* on February 7 that the United States, by encouraging the material aspirations of colonial peoples, was unconsciously playing into the hands of the Soviet Union, and did not realize the revolutionary consequences of its words and actions: . . . *Egyptian-Israeli armistice talks* at Rhodes were making positive progress, according to a February 7 statement of Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, acting UN mediator. Entry of other Arab states, including Trans-Jordan, which has been conducting unofficial conversations with Israel, into the Rhodes negotiations was expected, probably following a meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League. . . . Whether *Argentina* will take steps to discard objectionable features of its foreign economic policy, now that "economic czar" Miguel Miranda has been relegated to a

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

BALTIMORE, February 14, *Freedom in Asia*, Raymond J. Kennedy, Norman Brown
POUGHKEEPSIE, February 14, *The Issue Between Communism and Democracy*, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
UTICA, February 15, *U.S. Stake in European Union*, Allen W. Dulles
AUSTIN, February 17, *Basic Issues in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau
ELMIRA, February 17, *The North Atlantic Pact*, George Fielding Eliot
CINCINNATI, February 18, *Wooing Germany. Who Wins—Russia, U.S. or Germany?*, Sigrid Schultz, Alexander Boeker
HOUSTON, February 18, *Basic Trends in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau
NEW YORK, February 19, *The Crisis in China—What Policy?*, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Nathaniel Peffer
ST. PAUL, February 19, *International Monetary Problems*, Dr. E. M. Bernstein
TULSA, February 23, *Basic Issues in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau
OKLAHOMA CITY, February 24, *The Arab World in Revolt*, John S. Badeau
ST. LOUIS, February 25, *Basic Trends in the Middle East*, John S. Badeau

North Atlantic Pact

In response to many requests from various national organizations for material on the proposed NORTH ATLANTIC PACT, the Foreign Policy Association has decided to publish a *Foreign Policy Report* analyzing the background and pros and cons of the pact. This report, prepared by Blair Bolles and Vera Micheles Dean, will be published on February 15. PLACE YOUR ORDERS NOW to be sure of obtaining a copy.

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secondary position, is a question that still remains unanswered. Interested circles in New York and Washington hope that the retention of Foreign Minister Bramuglia, an opponent of Miranda's policies, may augur improvement in commercial and financial relations between the Argentine and the United States.

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